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Abstract
Suppose that a group of agents having divergent expectations can share risks efficiently. We
examine how this group should behave collectively to manage these risks. We show that the
beliefs of the representative agent is in general a function of the group.s wealth level, or
equivalently, that the representative agent has a state-dependent utility function. We define
the individual degree of pessimism as an index measuring probability differences across
states. We show that the degree of pessimism of the representative agent is the mean of the
individual ones weighted by their index of absolute risk tolerance. From this central result, we
show how increasing disagreement on the state probability affects the state probability of the
representative agent. We show that the divergence of opinions about the probability of
occurence of a boom may help solving the equity premium puzzle.
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People have divergent opinions on a wide range of subjects, from the outcome
of an election or of a war, the pro￿tability of a new technology to the risk
of global warming. Suppose that this heterogeneity of beliefs does not come
from asymmetric information but rather from intrinsic diﬀerences in how to
view the world. People agree to disagree, which implies that prices and ob-
served behaviors of other market participants do not generate any Bayesian
updating of individual beliefs. We examine how the group as a whole will
behave towards risk. Aggregating beliefs when agents diﬀer on their expec-
tations is useful to solve various economic questions, from asset pricing to
cost-bene￿t analyses of collective risk prevention.
The attitude towards risk of a group of agents depends upon how risk
is allocated in the group. For example, if an agent is fully insured by other
agents, it is intuitive that this agent￿s beliefs should not aﬀect the social
welfare function. Only those who bear a share of the risk should see their
expectations be taken into account on the collective risk decision. In this
paper, we assume that risks can be allocated in a Pareto-eﬃcient way in the
group. In such a situation, the willingness to take risk is increasing in the
Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk tolerance. It implies that the beliefs of
agents with a larger risk tolerance have a larger impact on how individual
expectations are aggregated. At the limit, those with a zero risk tolerance do
not in￿uence the group￿s expectations.
The properties of the socially eﬃcient probability distribution are derived
from the characteristics of the eﬃcient allocation of risk in the group, such as
the one derived from the competitive allocation with complete Arrow-Debreu
markets. Borch (1960) and Wilson (1968) were the ￿rst to characterize the
properties of Pareto-eﬃcient risk sharings when agents have identical be-
liefs.1 Leland (1980) examined the competitive equilibrium asset portfolios
when agents have diﬀerent priors on the distribution of state probabilities. If
π(s) and p(s,θ) denote respectively the price of the Arrow-Debreu security
associated to state s and the subjective probability associated to that state by
agent θ, the demand for that security depends negatively upon π(s)/p(s,θ),
1
Hara and Kuzmics (2001) provide new results about how to aggregate risk
aversion when beliefs are homogeneous.
2the state price per unit of subjective probability. Ex ante, the degree of risk-
iness of the optimal portfolio for agent θ depends upon the volatility of this
true price with respect to s.F o r e x a m p l e , i f π(.) and p(.,θ) coincide, that
is if agent θ p e r c e i v e sa l la s s e tp r i c e sa sa c t u a r i a l l yp r i c e d ,t h e n h es h o u l d
buy a risk free portfolio. More generally, the riskiness of the optimal port-
folio of agent θ is increasing in the sensitivity of π(s)/p(s,θ) to changes in
s. It can be measured locally by the diﬀerence between δ
π(s)=−π0(s)/π(s)
and δ
p(s,θ)=−ps(s,θ)/p(s,θ). This diﬀerence is a measure of the degree
of divergence between the market beliefs and the beliefs of agent θ.I fl a r g e r
states are better, δ
π and δ
p measure respectively the market and the individ-
ual degrees of pessimism. If the agent is more pessimist than the market,
his demand for state-contingent consumption will be decreasing with s.S e e n
from ex ante, this means that the agent bears a risk. It is increasing in his
degree of pessimism. We conclude that information about individual degrees
of pessimism are more useful than the individual probability distributions
to determine eﬃcient allocations of risk in the economy. From this observa-
tion, we concentrate much of our attention in this paper to the eﬀect of the
heterogeneity of the individual degrees of pessimism on the socially eﬃcient
group￿s degree of pessimism.
We show that the beliefs of the representative agent in this economy is the
mean of the individual degrees of pessimism weighted by their absolute risk
tolerance. This central property of aggregation has various consequences. For
example, the representative agent usually has a state-dependent utility func-
tion, despite the fact that all members of the group have state-independent
preferences. The representative agent has state-additive preferences, but the
t e r m so ft h es u mc a n n o tb ew r i t t e na sap r o d u c to fap r o b a b i l i t yt h a tw o u l d
depend only upon the state by a utility that would depend only upon con-
sumption. DrŁze (2001) and DrŁze and Rustichini (2001) examine the eﬀect
of the state dependency of the utility function for risk management and risk
transfers. Another way to interpret this result is that the collective proba-
bility distribution depends upon the aggregate wealth level.
Our aggregation result also implies that the collective pessimism is within
the range of the individual degrees of pessimism. This result must be com-
pared to the observation that the state probability used by the representa-
tive agent does not need to be in between the smallest and the largest state
probabilities of the agents. Another consequence of this result is that, the
dispersion of individual subjective probabilities will aﬀect the collective de-
gree of pessimism. More dispersed individual (Pareto-weighted) subjective
3probabilities imply more dispersed individual state consumption levels. If
absolute risk tolerance is increasing, this will bias the collective degree of
pessimism towards the degree of pessimism of those who have a large subjec-
tive probability for that state. Thus, decreasing absolute risk aversion is the
condition that determines the eﬀect of locally increasing disagreement when
the mean degree of pessimism remains constant, at least locally.
We also compare the degree of pessimism of the representative agent with
the degree of pessimism that would be derived from the Pareto-weighted
mean of individual subjective probabilities. We show that increased dis-
agreement makes the degree of pessimism of the representative agent larger
if the derivative of absolute risk tolerance is smaller than unity, a plausible as-
sumption on preferences. This result is more general than the one obtained
by Varian (1985) and Ingersoll (1987) who compared two states of nature
with the same mean Pareto-weighted individual subjective probabilities.
All these results describe how the heterogeneity of beliefs aﬀects the local
slope of the collective distribution function. Going from the local analysis to
a global one, it is necessary to describe the structure of disagreements across
states. This would be useful to determine whether the collective distribution
function be stochastically dominated by the mean subjective distribution.
Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (2000) and Abel (2002) examine the eﬀect of a
change in the beliefs of the representative agent on the equity premium.
Contrary to us, they assume that all agents have the same beliefs that devi-
ate from what could be inferred from the existing data. However, their work
is useful to us because once the beliefs of the representative agent is obtained,
our model becomes equivalent to an economy with homogeneous beliefs. It
is not true in general that a ￿rst-order-stochastically dominated shift in the
subjective distribution of aggregate consumption raises the equity premium.
Abel (2002) de￿nes the notion of uniform pessimism by a leftward translation
of the objective distribution of the aggregate consumption. He shows that
uniform pessimism raises the equity premium. We provide another result
which states that transferring probability mass from the wealthiest states
uniformly to the other states also unambiguously raises the equity premium.
It happens that the heterogeneity of beliefs where most of the disagreement is
about the probability of the wealthiest states generates precisely this change
in the subjective distribution of the representative agent. We provide a nu-
merical illustration that shows that a disagreement on the likelihood of a
boom may have a sizeable positive eﬀect on the equity premium. In a plausi-
ble simulation, it multiplies the equity premium by 4. The bad news is that
4the equity premium is reduced when most of the disagreement is about the
likelihood of a krach. Calvet, Grandmont and Lemaire (2001) also examine
the eﬀect of heterogenous beliefs on the equity prmium. They are able to
sign this eﬀect when the relative risk aversion of the representative agent is
decreasing with average wealth.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we characterize the
optimal structure of the portfolio in an Arrow-Debreu economy. We de￿ne
our concept of pessimism. Section 3 is devoted to the description of the ag-
gregation problem when agents have heterogeneous preferences and beliefs.
We show how to aggregate individual risk tolerances in this framework in
section 4, whereas section 5 is devoted to the aggregation rule for individual
beliefs. In section 6, we examine the problem of the multiplicative separa-
bility between utility and probability. In section 7, we de￿ne our concept of
increasing disagreement, and we determine its eﬀect on the collective degree
of pessimism. Section 8 provides a global analysis of the eﬀect of the het-
erogeneity of beliefs on the collective probability distribution and the equity
premium. Finally, we present concluding concluding remarks in section 9.
2 Properties of optimal individual portfolios
In this section, we consider an agent θ who extracts utility from consuming a
single consumption good. The model is static with one decision date and one
consumption date. At the decision date, there is some uncertainty about the
state of nature s that will prevail at the consumption date. The set of possible
states of nature is denoted S ⊂ R. The agent is an expected-utility maximizer
with a state-dependent utility function u(.,.,θ):R￿S → R where u(c,s,θ)
is the utility of agent θ consuming c in state s. We assume that uc = ∂u/∂c
is continuously diﬀerentiable in (c,s), and is nonincreasing in c to express
risk aversion. We make no speci￿c assumption on the state dependency
of the marginal utility of consumption. We also assume that agent θ has
beliefs that can be represented by a density function p(.,θ):S → R+ which
is diﬀerentiable with respect to s. This subjective probability density is not
unique, for it is always possible to write b p(s,θ)b u(c,s,θ)=p(s,θ)u(c,s,θ)
where functions b p and b u are arbitrarily chosen with
R
S b p(s,θ)ds =1 .
There is a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities in the economy. The
equilibrium price of the Arrow-Debreu security associated to state s is de-
noted π(s,θ) > 0. It means that agent θ must pay π(s,θ) ex-ante to receive
5one unit of the consumption good if and only if state s occurs.2 We normalize
prices in such a way that
R
S π(s,θ)=1 . The agent is endowed with wealth
z ex ante to ￿nance future consumption. We examine the optimal portfolio
of Arrow-Debreu securities for agent θ. It is the solution of the following
program:








π(s,θ)C(s)ds = z. (2)
The optimal portfolio is characterized by function c,w h e r eC∗(s)=c(z,s,θ)
is the demand of agent θ endowed with initial wealth z for the Arrow-Debreu
security associated to state s. The value function V is such that V (z,θ) is
the maximum expected utility that agent θ can extract from initial wealth
z. We suppose that a solution to this program exists. Given the concavity
of u with respect to c,i ti su n i q u e .
The following ￿rst-order condition is necessary and suﬃcient: for all s ∈
S, for all z,
lnp(s,θ)+l nuc(c(z,s,θ),s,θ)=l nπ(s,θ)+l nVz(z,s). (3)
Fully diﬀerentiating this condition with respect to z and using the budget


















An increase in initial wealth raises the demand for Arrow-Debreu securities
w h i c ha r et h u sn o r m a lg o o d s .T h ei n c r e a s ei nd e m a n di sp r o p o r t i o n a lt ot h e
degree of absolute risk tolerance measured in the corresponding state.
2The dependency of state prices to the type θ of the agent is made for the sake of
generality and is not essential in this paper. It allows for exploring the sensitivity of the
optimal portfolio to changes in the distribution of contingent prices.













This would be useful for example to determine the optimal risk to be taken
prior to the decision period that is considered in this section. Using the







The absolute risk tolerance on wealth is the ￿risk-neutral￿ mean of the state-
dependent absolute risk tolerances on consumption. This property has sev-
eral implications for dynamic portfolio management that are examined in
Gollier (2001, chapter 14). For example, V inherits the property of increas-
ing absolute tolerance from the state-dependent utility functions u(.,s,θ).
The riskiness of the optimal portfolio can be evaluated by the variability
of consumption across states. A local measure of such variability is given by
cs(z,s,θ). Fully diﬀerentiating the ￿rst-order condition (3) with respect to s
and using again the budget constraint (2) provides a characterization of the



























T h ed e l t a sm e a s u r et h er a t ea tw h i c hf u n c t i o n sπ, p,a n duc decrease when
considering increasing states s. The simplest case is when the utility function
is state independent (sδ
u ≡ 0) and when state prices are proportional to state
probabilities (sδ
π ≡ sδ
p). In this special case, property (7) just means that
the risk-averse investor purchases a risk free portfolio (cs ≡ 0).I f w e r e l a x
the assumption that asset prices are actuarial, property (7) implies that
7consumption is increasing with the state if states corresponding to a larger
s have a smaller price per unit of probability: cs > 0 if π/p is decreasing in
s,o ri fsδ
π is larger than sδ
p.
It is good to give names to these concepts. To do this, let us rank states
in such a way that larger states correspond to larger ex post utility for agent
θ. Larger states are better states from the point of view of agent θ.U n d e r
this assumption, sδ
p(s,θ) , which measures the rate at which subjective state
probabilities for agent θ decrease as s improves, is a local measure of pes-
simism. Similarly, sδ
π(s,θ) is a measure of the market￿s degree of pessimism
implicit in the pricing kernel. Thus, under the assumption that δ
u ≡ 0, prop-
erty (7) implies that consumption is increasing with the state if the investor
is less pessimistic than the market about the likelihood of high/good states.
Ex ante, this means that agent θ takes risk. As seen in (7), the optimal
local risk exposure is proportional to the agent￿s local degree of absolute risk
tolerance Tu.
When sδ
u is positive, that is, when the marginal utility of consumption
is decreasing with the state, the willingness to consume more in higher state
is reduced, as seen in the right-hand side of equation (7). This reinforces
the eﬀect of pessimism. Equation (7) tells us that what matters to deter-
mine the optimal riskiness of the portfolio is the sum of sδ
p and sδ
u.I n
other words, observing household portfolios does not allow for disentangling
household pessimism from the state-dependency of utility. This is inherent
to the de￿nition of state-dependent expected utility, where it is hard to make
the diﬀerence between probabilities and utils.3 Thus, sδ
p + sδ
u = − ∂
∂s lnpuc
will be called the corrected degree of pessimism.
We can also easily examine the sensitivity of the optimal portfolio c and
of the marginal value of wealth Vz to changes of the model speci￿cation. One
can examine the eﬀect of a change in the beliefs p of the investor, of a change
in the investor￿s degree of risk tolerance, or of a change in asset prices. Fully
diﬀerentiating the ￿rst-order condition (3) with respect to θ and using the













3See DrŁze and Rustichini (2001) for a discussion on this point.
8and
θδ

























The mu functions measure the degree of heterogeneity in the model speci￿-
cations, respectively for π, p,a n duc. Equation (11) shows how the optimal
portfolio c is aﬀected by a change in asset prices (θδ
π), a change in beliefs
(θδ
p), or by a change in the risk preferences (θδ
u). In equation (12), we char-
acterize their eﬀect on the marginal value of wealth (θδ
V). These equations
will be central later in this paper. Some comments are in order here. First,
observe from (11) that the sensitivity of the optimal portfolio to changes in
speci￿cation is proportional to the investor￿s degree of absolute risk toler-
ance. In a sense, risk aversion is an index of stubbornness. Second, consider
the eﬀect of a change in beliefs (θδ
π = θδ
u ≡ 0). Observe that in this case
θδ
V is a weighted sum of the rate of reduction in state probabilities θδ
p,
which can be positive or negative. Suppose that θδ
V is positive. Then, there
must exist some states for which θδ
p > 0 and θδ
V − θδ
p > 0.I ti m p l i e sf r o m
(11) that the investor would increase his demand for consumption in these
states in spite of the fact that he believes that they are less likely to occur!
This observation provides an important message for the remaining of this
paper: what matters to determine the optimal exposure to risk are not the
state probabilities per se. The important concept is the investor￿s degree of
pessimism relative to the market￿s one.4
4Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), there has been an important
litterature on the eﬀect of a change in risk on the optimal demand for risky assets. Gollier
(1995) derives the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a change in risk to raise the
demand for the risky asset by all risk-averse agents.
9It is noteworthy that we did not use assumption
R
p(s,θ)ds =1to derive
the results presented in this section. This remark will be important in the
remaining of this paper. Indeed, we will use alternative interpretations of
program (1) where the p function does not sum up to unity.
In the next section, we reconsider the same portfolio problem, but we
go from the individual level to the collective one. Following Constantinides
(1982), this raises the question problem of how to aggregate individual pref-
erences and beliefs.
3 The aggregation problem
We consider an economy or a group of heterogeneous agents indexed by θ
in a type set Θ. Types are distributed according to cumulative distribution
function H : Θ → [0,1]. Agents are heterogeneous in terms of risk attitude,
beliefs and wealth. This is re￿ected in the dependency of the u, p and ω
functions to θ. E denotes the expectation operator with respect to e θ with
distribution H, i.e., Ef(e θ)=
R
Θ f(θ)dH(θ) is the mean of f(e θ) with respect
to the type distribution H.
The group faces a portfolio choice that is equivalent to the one described
in the previous section. A consumption plan is described by a function
C(.,.):S ￿ Θ → R . The consumption per capita in state s is denoted
z(s):
EC(s,e θ)=z(s) (16)
for all s ∈ S.
The crucial assumption of this paper is that the group can allocate risks
eﬃciently among its members. An allocation C(.,.):S ￿Θ → R+ is Pareto-
eﬃcient if it is feasible and there is no other feasible allocation that raises
the expected utility of at least one member without reducing the expected
utility of the others. For a given Pareto-weight function λ(.):Θ → R+,
normalized in such a way that Eλ(e θ)=1 , the group would select the portfolio
of Arrow-Debreu securities and the allocation of the risk within the group

















C(s,e θ) − ω(s,e θ)
i
ds =0 . (18)
It is useful to decompose this decision problem into two stages. De￿ne




λ(e θ)p(s,e θ)u(c(z,s,e θ),s,e θ)
i
s.t. Ec(z,s,e θ)=z. (19)
In this cake-sharing problem, z represents the consumption per capita, and
v(z,s) is the maximum sum of subjective-probability-weighted utility in state
s. The second stage is a collective portfolio problem in which the group selects









π(s)[z(s) − ω(s)]ds =0 , (20)
where ω(s)=Eω(s,e θ) is the endowment per capita in state s. Obviously,
combining these two-stage problems generates the solution to program (17),
with C(s,θ)=c(z(s),s,θ).
This decomposition is interesting for various reasons. Notice ￿rst that
the v function describes the risk attitude and beliefs of the representative
agent in the sense of Constantinides (1982). It is implicitly a product of the
collective state probabilities by the collective utility for consumption per
capita. However, it is not true in general that the representative agent has
preferences and beliefs that are multiplicatively separable as in the standard
expected utility model. The implicit subjective probabilities of the represen-
tative agent may be wealth-dependent, or equivalently, the utility function of
the representative agent may be state-dependent. This is why we considered
the non-separable case in the previous section. Being neither a probability
nor a utility, but rather the contribution of the state to ex-ante expected util-
ity, v will hereafter be referred to as the contribution function. The existence
of such a contribution function for the representative agent extends previous
aggregation results by Wilson (1968) and Constantinides (1982) to the case
of heterogeneous preferences. Such an extension is a direct consequence of
the additive separability of the individual preference functionals.
Second, observe that the portfolio stage (20) is a special case of the prob-
lem that we solved in the previous section. It implies in particular that the
degree of riskiness of the optimal collective portfolio ￿ which is measured by
















These characteristics of the preferences and beliefs of the representative
a g e n tm u s tb ed e r i v e df r o mt h ed e ￿nition (19) of the v function. The objec-
tive of this paper is to link Tv and δ
v to the distribution of individual traits Tu
and δ
p in the group to derive various implications from these links. This work
is much simpli￿ed by the following central insight relative to program (19).
This cake-sharing problem is not much diﬀerent from the individual portfolio
problem (1). In these two maximization programs, both the objective func-
tion and the constraint is additively separable, either with respect to states s
for (1), or with respect to types θ for (19). Using the paradigm of the veil of
ignorance, the cake-sharing problem is in fact a portfolio problem.6 Under the
veil of ignorance, the uncertainty is about how types will be allocated among
the group￿s members. Suppose that in state s, agents believe that the prob-
ability to get a type within [θ,θ + dθ] equals λ(θ)p(s,θ)dH(θ)/Eλ(e θ)p(s,e θ).
Then, given a speci￿cc a k ep e rc a p i t az, the ex-ante identical agents will
unanimously favor the selection of the cake-sharing rule c(z,s,e θ) ￿ actually
a portfolio of type-contingent claims ￿ that maximizes their expected utility
described in (19). Because this is a zero-sum game, the type-prices implicit
in the budget/feasibility constraint Eπ(e θ)c(z,s,e θ)=z is π(θ) ≡ 1.
The equivalence property is central because it allows us to use all proper-
ties that we derived earlier. This simple exercise consisting in reinterpreting
program (1) as a cake-sharing problem requires some words of caution, how-
ever. In the state-contingent cake-sharing problem, the role of θ and s are
r e v e r s e dc o m p a r e dt ot h ep o r t f o l i op r o b l e m .It is now θ which is random, and
s becomes a parameter. The comparative statics exercise of a change in the
parameter θ on the optimal portfolio that we performed at the end of section
5Nau (2002) discusses the measure of risk aversion in the small and in the large in the
case of state-dependent utilities.
6Gollier (2001) summarizes the links between the two decision problems when agents
share common beliefs.
122 is now useful to determine how the eﬃcient cake-sharing is aﬀected by the
choice of s. This will be useful in a second step to determine how the collec-
tive subjective probabilities change across states (sδ
v). The interpretation of
z is also transformed. In the portfolio problem, z is the ex-ante wealth of the
investor, whereas in the cake-sharing problem, z(s) is the wealth per capita
available in state s ex post. Finally, the V function in the portfolio problem
(1) corresponds to the contribution function v in the cake-sharing problem
(19).
4 Aggregation of risk aversion
As a ￿rst illustration of the usefulness of the equivalence of the portfolio
and cake-sharing problems, let us consider the problem of determining the
properties of the eﬃcient sharing of the risk in the group. It is characterized
by ∂c/∂z which determines how diﬀerences of wealth per capita across states
must be allocated to diﬀerences in individual consumption levels. Using







One can interpret this property of the eﬃcient risk-sharing rule as follows:
suppose that there are two states of nature that are perceived to be iden-
tical by all agents, expect for the mean income z. In particular, probabili-
ties and conditional utility functions are identical for the two states. Equa-
tion (23) shows how to allocate the collective wealth diﬀerential in the two
states. Observe that the positiveness of the right-hand side of (23) means
that individual consumption levels are all procyclical. Adapting Wilson
(1968) to the case of state-dependent preferences, more risk-tolerant agents
should bear a larger fraction of the collective risk. More precisely, for any
s ∈ S, their optimal consumption plan will single-cross from below the opti-
mal consumption plan of any less risk-tolerant agents in the (z,c) diagram:
∀(θ,θ
0) ∈ Θ2 : T(c,s,θ) ≥ T(c,s,θ









This property can be better understood if ￿rst we recall the mutuality princi-
ple. In the classical case with state-independent utility functions and homo-
geneous beliefs, it states that eﬃcient individual consumption levels depend
13upon the state only through the wealth per capita z. Its economic interpre-
tation is that all diversi￿able risks are eliminated through sharing. In this
classical case, the wealth level per capita z is a suﬃcient statistic for eﬃcient
individual consumption levels, and property (24) shows that agent θ bears a
larger share of the aggregate risk than agent θ
0. He consumes relatively more
in the wealthier states, and relatively less in the poorer ones.
From this eﬃcient collective risk-sharing rule, it is easy to derive the
degree of risk tolerance of the group as a whole. In parallel to equation (6),
it is written as
T
v(z,s)=ET
u(c(z,s,e θ),s,e θ). (25)
The group￿s absolute risk tolerance is the mean of its members￿ tolerance. We
conclude that this rule already valid in the simpler Wilson￿s model is robust
to the introduction of either heterogeneous expectations or state-contingent
preferences.
5 The group￿s index of pessimism
When beliefs are homogenous and individual utility functions are state-
independent,the mutuality principle states that eﬃcient individual consump-
tion levels depend upon the state only through the mean wealth z available
in the corresponding state: ∂c/∂s ≡ 0. With heterogeneous beliefs or state-
dependent utility functions, this result is of course not true. For example,
agents will ￿nd mutually advantageous exchanges of zero-sum lotteries in
order to gamble on states that they believe to be more likely than their
counterpart. In the following, we examine the partial derivative of individ-
ual consumption levels with respect to states. It characterizes the eﬃcient
allocation of diversi￿able risks in the group.
The eﬃcient allocation of the diversi￿able risk depends upon how the
corrected degrees of pessimism diﬀer across the members of the group. The







The following Proposition is a direct consequence of the equivalence property
together with equations (11) and (12).
14Proposition 1 The index of pessimism of the representative agent de￿ned






















Let us ￿rst focus on property (28). This result implies that more (cor-
rected) pessimistic people should substitute consumption in high states for
consumption in lower states. The following Proposition describes this intu-
itive property of eﬃcient risk allocations. This single-crossing property in the
(s,c) diagram is closely related to the single-crossing property in the (z,c)
diagram that we described in the previous section.7
Proposition 2 Suppose that agents have the same state-independent risk
tolerance : ∂Tu(c,s,θ)/∂θ = ∂Tu(c,s,θ)/∂s ≡ 0. Suppose also that condi-
tional on wealth per capita z,i n d e xθ ranks agents according to their degree
of pessimism : ∀(θ,θ
















Proof: This is a direct consequence of equation (28) with sδ
pu ≡ sδ
p.¥
The assumption that sδ
p is uniformly increasing in θ just means that the
likelihood ratio p(s,θ)/p(s,θ
0) is decreasing in s when θ > θ
0. This corre-
sponds to the Monotone Likelihood Ration (MLR) order which is a special
case of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. When agent θ has expectations
that are MLR dominated by agent θ
0￿s expectations, the ￿rst will consume
relatively more in low states, and relatively less in high states.
7The duality between the notion of more risk aversion and more pessimism remind us
some works by Athey (2001) and Gollier (2001, chapter 7) who examine dual relationship
between the concepts of ￿more risk aversion￿, the monotone likelihood ratio order, and
logsupermodular functions.
15Condition (27) provides a nice characterization of the aggregation of indi-
vidual beliefs in groups that can share risk eﬃciently. The group￿s corrected











For each state, the (corrected) index of pessimism of the representative agent
is a weighted mean of the individual corrected degrees of pessimism. The
weights are proportional to the corresponding individual degree of absolute
risk tolerance. This weighting function is intuitive. Consider a group with
two agents having heterogeneous degree of pessimism. Suppose also that the
second agent has a lower index of pessimism, but a zero tolerance to risk.
Agent 2 will prefer not to gamble in spite of agent 1 oﬀering attractive state
prices for high states. Therefore, agent 1 will bear the entire burden of risk.
The group￿s beliefs must therefore rely entirely on agent 1￿s beliefs. The
group￿s degree of pessimism will be the larger index of pessimism of the ￿rst
agent. More generally, it is natural that the beliefs of the group to take
collective risk decision should be biased in favor of those who bear a larger
fraction of this risk, i.e. those who are more risk tolerant. This is the meaning
of property (27).
As a direct consequence of the fact that sδ
v is a weighted mean, it is











for all (z,s). It is important to notice that the weight function T is a function
of z and s. This is made explicit in the notation by indexing the expectation
operator b E by (z,s). Thus, even when the individual degrees of pessimism
are wealth independent, the societal degree of pessimism needs not be a
function of wealth. We examine the relationship between δ
v and z in the
next section.
166W e a l t h e ﬀect on the collective degree of
pessimism
In the rest of this paper, we will make the simplifying assumption that in-
dividual utility functions are state-independent: us ≡ 0. This has two con-
sequences. First, individual risk tolerances are also independent of the state.
Second, the individual degrees of pessimism need not to be corrected by
sδ
u, and is therefore independent of aggregate wealth. We use this sim-




Assuming that all members of the group have a multiplicatively separa-
ble contribution function p(s,θ)u(c,θ) does not imply that the contribution
function of the representative agent inherits this property from them. This
can be seen from equation (29) where the risk-neutral expectation operator
b Ezs is wealth-dependent. This implies that the representative agent may
have a risk tolerance that depends directly upon the state, or equivalently,
that he may have a degree of pessimism that is wealth dependent. These two
ways of describing the absence of separability of the contribution function is












When the contribution is not multiplicatively separable, one can say that the
representative agent has a state-dependent utility function, or equivalently,
that its subjective probability function is sensitive to change in aggregate
wealth.
We start with examining an important special case where such a wealth
eﬀect does not exist. It corresponds to situations where the derivative of
individual risk tolerances ∂Tu/∂c are all identical and consumption indepen-
dent. The corresponding set of utility functions is referred to as ISHARA. A
utility function has an Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) if its ab-
solute risk tolerance is linear in consumption: ∂Tu/∂c(c,θ)=1 /γ(θ) for all
c. A set of utility functions satis￿es the Identically Sloped HARA (ISHARA)
property if their absolute risk tolerances are linear in consumption with the
same slope: γ(θ)=γ for all θ. The set of utility functions that satis￿es these







These utility functions are de￿ned over the consumption domain such
that γ−1( c − a(θ)) > 0.W h e nγ > 0, parameter a(θ) i so f t e nr e f e r r e dt oa s
the minimum level of subsistence. This preference set includes preferences
with heterogeneous exponential utility functions u(c,t,θ)=−exp(−A(θ)c)
when γ tends to +∞, and a(θ)/γ tends to −1/A(θ). Taking a(θ)=0for all
θ, it also includes the set of power (and logarithmic) utility functions with
t h es a m er e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nγ for all θ.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the individual utility functions are state-independent.
The collective degree of pessimism is independent of the wealth per capita
in the group (∂sδ
v/∂z ≡ 0) if and only if the members of the group have
ISHARA preferences (32).


















where Tu and its derivative are evaluated at (c(z,s,e θ),e θ), and where b E = b Ezs
is the ￿risk-neutral￿ expectation operator de￿ned by (30). For ISHARA
preferences, ∂Tu/∂c is a constant, which implies that the right-hand side
vanishes, and sδ
v is independent of the per capita wealth in the group. To





















It implies that the derivative of sδ
v with respect to z is zero for all distribu-
tions of e θ only if f(z,s,θ) is zero uniformly for all θ ∈ Θ.F r o mt h ed e ￿nition
of function f, this is the case only if ∂Tu/∂c is independent of c and θ,w h i c h
means that the group has ISHARA preferences.¥
18The ISHARA condition guarantees that the weights Tu/ETu in the ex-
pectation operator b Ezs remains constant when the wealth level changes in the
group. Notice that the ISHARA condition is also necessary for this result.
This means that if this condition does not hold, one can ￿nd a distribution
of individual beliefs in the group such that the collective degree of pessimism
depends upon z. In Appendix A, we derive an analytical solution to the
aggregation problem when the ISHARA condition is satis￿ed.
In Proposition 3, we assumed that the derivative of individual absolute
risk tolerances and individual degrees of pessimism are independently dis-
tributed. In the following Proposition, we alternatively assume that less
pessimistic people have a risk tolerance that is more sensitive to changes in
consumption. In such a situation, the collective degree of pessimism will be
decreasing with the consumption per capita in the economy, in spite of the
fact that all consumers have consumption-independent degrees of pessimism.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the individual utility functions are state-independent.
The collective degree of pessimism is decreasing with wealth locally in state
(z,s) if sδ and ∂Tu/∂c evaluated respectively at (s,e θ) and (c(z,s,e θ),e θ) are
anti-comonotone: ∀(θ,θ











Proof: This is a direct consequence of equation (33).¥
There is a simple intuition for this result. It comes again from the fact
that collective pessimism is a weighted mean of the individual degrees of
pessimism. When sδ
p and ∂Tu/∂c are anti-comonotone, an increase in wealth
has a larger impact on the weights Tu associated to the lower degrees of
impatience. An increase in z must then biases sδ
v in favor of less pessimism.
In the special case of utility functions exhibiting constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), viz. u(c,θ)=c1−γ(θ)/(1 − γ(θ)), there is a negative rela-
tionship between relative risk aversion γ(θ) and ∂T/∂c(c,θ)=1 /γ(θ).T h u s ,
the above Proposition applied in the case of CRRA utility functions means
that the rate of impatience is a decreasing function of aggregate wealth if
less pessimistic agents people are also less risk-averse. The following ex-
ample illustrates this point. All agents have constant relative risk aversion.
The set of state variables is S =[ 0 ,+∞[ with no aggregate risk (z(s)=z
for all s). All individual beliefs belong to the negative exponential law with
p(s,θ)=θexp(−θs), which implies that sδ
p(s,θ)=θ.8 There are two types
8When all beliefs are distributed as p(s,θ)=θexp(−θs), an increase in θ represents a










Figure 1: The collective degree of pessimism for two diﬀerent wealth level
when individual degrees of pessimism and relative risk aversion are both
constant and are negatively correlated. The values of the parameters are
θp =2 , θo =1 , γp =1and γo =1 0 .
of agents. The pessimistic type p has a degree of pessimism θp and a con-
stant risk aversion γp, whereas the optimistic type o has a lower degree of
pessimism θo < θp and a higher degree of risk aversion γo > γp.I nF i g u r e1 ,
we have drawn the collective degree of pessimism for the eﬃcient allocation
associated to Pareto-weights with λ(θp)/λ(θo)=θ0/θp, respectively when
the group￿s wealth per capita equals z =0 .5 and z =1 .5.W es e et h a tt h e
poorer group is more pessimistic at the collective level.
7T h e e ﬀect of increasing disagreement on
t h ec o l l e c t i v ed e g r e eo fp e s s i m i s m
We establish here the link between the collective degree of pessimism char-
acterized by sδ
v and the heterogeneity of individual indexes of pessimism. In
order to focus on the heterogeneity of beliefs, we assume in this section that
risk preferences are homogenous: ∂Tu/∂θ ≡ 0. In a given group, we compare
uniform increase in pessimism in the sense of Abel (2002).
20states in the neighborhood of s ∈ S, with the same wealth per capita z,
but with a diﬀerent distribution of individual subjective state probabilities.
In this section, we ￿rst de￿ne the notion of increasing disagreement, which
basically means that the distribution of the state probability across agents
becomes more dispersed when comparing increasing s ∈ S.W e t h e n s h o w
how the increase in disagreement aﬀect the collective degree of pessimism.
7.1 Increasing disagreement
We consider the distribution of q(s,e θ)=λ(e θ)p(s,e θ) where q(s,θ) denotes
the Pareto-weighted subjective probability of state s by agent θ.T h ec a k e -
sharing problem (19) can then be rewritten as






s.t. Ec(z,s,e θ)=z. (34)
Suppose without loss of generality that q(s,θ) is nonincreasing in θ for the
state s under consideration. We de￿ne the measure of disagreement as
θδ
q(s,θ)=−∂ lnq(s,θ)/∂θ ≥ 0.
We assume that, in the neighborhood of s, larger states correspond to more
disagreement. In other words, we assume that q(s,e θ) has a more dispersed
distribution when s increases. Using ∂θδ
q/∂s = ∂sδ
q/∂θ, we have the follow-
ing de￿nition.
De￿nition 1 Consider a speci￿c state of nature s, and de￿ne types in such
a way that qθ(s,θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. We say that disagreement is locally
increasing in s if θδ
q(s,θ) is increasing in s. T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt or e q u i r e
that q satis￿es the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) property that sδ
q(s,θ)
is increasing in θ, or that q(s,θ)/q(s,θ
0) is increasing in s whenever θ < θ
0.
In other words, q(s,θ) and sδ











q(s,θ) ≤ 0. (35)
Disagreement is increasing in s because high types θ have a low q which is
decreasing relatively more quickly with s.T h e r e b y ,i ta m p l i ￿es the dispersion





θ 2> θ 1
θ 3> θ 2
Figure 2: In the neighborhood of s, disagreement on the Pareto-weighted
state probability is increasing with the state.
increasing disagreement does not constrain in any way how the mean state
probability ￿uctuates across states.
The dispersion of q(s,e θ) is related to consumption inequalities in state
s. Using the equivalence with the individual portfolio problem (1) and more





The absolute value of cθ(z,s,θ) is a local measure of the degree of consump-
tion inequality in state (z,s). This equation explains why we use θδ
q rather
than θδ
p to measure disagreement. Indeed, it is diﬀerences in q rather than
diﬀerences in p which explains the inequality in the distribution of consump-
tion. This distribution of individual consumption levels and its subsequent
eﬀect on risk tolerances are the driving forces behind the determination of
the collective degree of pessimism.
227.2 Comparison of collective pessimism with the mean
individual degree of pessimism
In an homogenous economy, all agents have the same degree of pessimism sδ
p
which are perfectly in line with the collective degree of pessimism sδ
v.I nt h i s
subsection, we examine the eﬀect of disagreement on collective pessimism.
More speci￿cally, we characterize the conditions under which sδ
v(z,s) is
smaller than Esδ
p(s,e θ). As explained earlier, this is what matters to relate
individual rules to collective rules for portfolio choices and asset pricing. We
will show that the relationship between sδ
v and Esδ
p depends upon whether




p(s,e θ) denote the mean individual degree of pessimism.

















The simplest case arises when all agents in the heterogeneous group have
the same utility function with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). This
i st h eo n l yc a s eg u a r a n t e e i n gt h a tw e i g h t sTu/ET u in equation (37) are
uniformly equal to unity, which implies that sδ
v(z,s)= sδ
p
(s) for all (z,s).
The heterogeneity of beliefs has no eﬀect on the collective degree of pessimism
in that case.
Condition (37) can be rewritten as
E
sδ












T h ef o l l o w i n gL e m m ai su s e f u lt os o l v et h i sk i n do fp r o b l e m .
Lemma 1 Consider two functions f1 and f2 from R to R++,a n dg : R → R.
Then, the following two conditions are equivalent:
1. For any random variable e θ and for any constant g, Ef1(e θ)g(e θ)=
gEf1(e θ) implies that Ef2(e θ)g(e θ) ≤ gEf2(e θ).
2. f1(θ)/f2(θ) and g(θ) are comonotone.
23Proof: It is a direct consequence of the ￿diﬃdence theorem￿ in Gollier
and Kimball (1996) (Proposition 11 in Gollier (2001)). ¥
Let us de￿ne types in such a way that qθ(s,θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.W e
can apply this Lemma where its statement 1 corresponds to condition (38)
with f1(θ)=1 , f2(θ)=Tu(c(z,s,θ)) and g(θ)= sδ
p(s,θ) for all θ.B e -
cause we assume that s is in the region of increasing disagreement, func-
tion g is increasing in θ. Thus, statement 2 in the Lemma requires that
Au(c(z,s,θ)) = (Tu(c(z,s,θ)))−1 be increasing in θ.B e c a u s e qθ ≤ 0,e q u a -
tion (36) tells us that c is decreasing in θ. We conclude that condition (38)
is satis￿ed if and only if Au is decreasing in c. This result is summarized in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the individual utility functions are identical and
state-independent. Consider a state s ∈ S around which there is increasing
disagreement. The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. The collective degree of pessimism sδ
v(z,s) is smaller than the mean
individual degree of pessimism sδ
p
(s)=Esδ
p(s,e θ) for all distributions
of e θ ;
2 .T h ea b s o l u t er i s kt o l e r a n c eTu(c) is increasing in c (DARA).
An increase in disagreement that maintains the mean degree of pessimism
reduces collective pessimism if agents have decreasing absolute risk aversion.
This property is reversed under increasing absolute risk aversion. Observe
that these results describe properties that are purely local in a neighborhood
of s with increasing or decreasing disagreement. In the next Proposition, we
take a more global approach by assuming that the MLR condition holds for
all s ∈ S.
Proposition 6 Suppose that all agents have the same state-independent util-
ity function that exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. Suppose also that
the MLR condition ∂sδ
q/∂θ ≥ 0 holds for all s ∈ S,a n dt h a tt h e r ee x i s t sa
state t ∈ S such that q(t,θ)=q for all θ ∈ Θ. It implies that, for all z,t h e
collective degree of pessimism sδ
v(z,s) crosses the mean degree of pessimism
sδ
p
(s) only at t,f r o ma b o v e .
Proof: By assumption, qθ(s,θ)=0for all θ at s = t. It implies by (36)




(t). Using Proposition 5, we just need to prove that qθ is negative for all
s larger than t, a n dt h a ti ti sp o s i t i v ef o ra l ls smaller than t. Observe that
the MLR condition ∂sδ
q/∂θ ≥ 0 implies that qθs ≤ 0 at any s were qθ =0 .I t
implies that the qθ c u r v ec a nc r o s st h eh o r i z o n t a ls−axis only once at t for
all θ, from above.¥
To illustrate, let us consider a group with DARA in which all agents￿ ex-
pectations are representable by negative exponential laws: p(s,θ)=θexp(−θs).
This implies that sδ
q(s,θ)=θ. Let us consider the Pareto-eﬃcient risk shar-
ing which corresponds to λ(θp)=λ(θo). There are two types of agents re-
spectively with degree of pessimism θp and θo ≤ θp. It yields a crossing state
t =(logθp − logθo)/(θp − θo). From any state s, selecting another state in
the direction opposite to t yields more disagreement. The above Proposition
states that the heterogeneity of beliefs yields relatively more pessimistic in
low states, and relatively less pessimistic in high states. Figure ?? illustrates
this case with u(c)=c0.9, θo =1and θp =2 .










Eﬀect of disagreement on the collective degree of pessimism.
What insights does it bring for the collective risk management? Suppose
that the reference rule for the collective decision maker is to estimate the
individual sδ
q. From the distribution of the individual degrees of pessimism,
the decision-maker extracts the mean. This mean sδ
p
is then used to select
the optimal collective risk exposure by using the rules presented in section




(s). From his computation of sδ
p
, market prices are actuarially
fair. Following portfolio rule (7), it implies that the planner recommends
the group to fully insure their collective risk (cs =0 ). By doing so, the
decision-maker overlooks the fact that the heterogeneity in the distribution
of pessimism in the population induces people to speculate on the states that
they believe are relatively more likely to occur. Because those bearing risk
should receive a larger weight in the mean, this reference rule is not eﬃcient.
When the MLR condition is satis￿ed, Proposition 6 states that the decision-
maker overestimates the collective degree of pessimism in the region of S with
increasing disagreement. By equation (7), his eﬃcient net demand for Arrow-
Debreu securities should be decreasing in s in this subset of S. Reciprocally,
the eﬃcient state consumption per capita should be decreasing in s in the
region of S with decreasing disagreement. In the example presented above,
it means that the socially eﬃcient consumption per capita is U-shaped with
respect to s.
One can translate this results on collective pessimism into their equiva-
lent eﬀect on collective subjective probabilities. Let b p denote the probability
distribution that yields a degree of pessimism sδ
p
, i.e., −b ps(s)/b p(s)= sδ
p
(s)
for all s. This would the implicit density function that the planner would
take under the reference decision rule. We compare it to the eﬃcient density
function pv(z,s)=vz(z,s)/
R
S vz(z(t),t)dt.C o m p a r e d t o b p,t h eh e t e r o g e -
neous group uses collective subjective density pv in which some probability
mass is taken away from an interval in the center of the support of states
to be transferred to the extreme states, as seen in Figure 3 for the example




generates a double-crossing property in the density functions.
Corollary 1 Suppose that all agents have the same state-independent utility
function that exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. Suppose also that the
MLR condition ∂sδ
q/∂θ ≥ 0 holds for all s ∈ S, and that there exists a state
t ∈ S such that q(t,θ)=q for all θ ∈ Θ. It implies that, for all z,t h e r e




≤ b p(s) if s ∈ Iz
≥ b p(s) if s / ∈ Iz, (39)
where the probability densities pv and b p are characterized respectively by
−pv
s(z,s)/pv(z,s)= sδ
v(z,s) and −b p(s)/b p(s)= sδ
p
(s). These inequalities
are reversed under increasing absolute risk aversion.











Figure 3: Eﬀect of disagreement on the collective probability density.












for all s ≤ t. It implies in turn that there can exist at most one t1 = t1(z) ≤ t
such that pv(z,t1)=b p(t1).M o r e o v e r ,a ts = t1, the above inequality implies
that pv








for all s ≥ t. It implies that there can exist at most one t2 = t2(z) ≥ t such
that pv(z,t2)=b p(t2),w i t hpv
s(z,t2) ≥ b p0(t2). This concludes the proof, with
Iz =[ t1,t 2]. ¥
277.3 Comparison of collective pessimism with the probability-
weighted mean of individual degrees of pessimism
In the reference aggregation rule that we considered above, we assumed
that the planner ￿rst estimates individual degrees of pessimism sδ
p(.,e θ) from
which he computes the mean sδ
p
(.). We showed how this miscalibration af-
fects the socially eﬃcient collective risk exposure. In this section, we consider
an alternative aggregation procedure for the planner. Namely, we assume
that the planner ￿rst estimates the individual subjective probabilities p(.,e θ)
f r o mw h i c hh ec o m p u t e st h eP a r e t o - w e i g h t e dm e a n− → p (.)=Eλ(e θ)p(.,e θ).H e
then estimates an aggregate degree of pessimism by computing s− →
δ p(.)=−
− → p s(.)/ − → p (.) in order to apply the portfolio rules described in section 2 at
the collective level. This aggregation rule yields policy recommendations that
diﬀer from those obtained with the reference aggregation rule. We examine in
this subsection the miscalibration of such alternative aggregation procedure.
We want to determine the conditions under which sδ











Observe that s− →
δ p is a probability-weighted mean of individual degrees of
pessimism. We can use Lemma 1 by observing that sδ






















Before presenting this result, it is noteworthy that condition sδ
v(z,s) ≤
s− →
δ p(s) is more demanding than sδ
v(z,s) ≤ sδ
p
(s) in the region of increasing
disagreement. This is because s− →
δ p(s) is smaller than sδ
p
(s) in this region.
This is due to the fact that increasing disagreement is equivalent to the as-
sumption that q(s,θ) and sδ




p(s,e θ) ≤ Eq(s,e θ)E
sδ
p(s,e θ).
This observation induces that the restriction on preferences that guarantees
the comparative statics property will be stronger than decreasing absolute
risk aversion (Tu
c (c) ≥ 0 for all c).
28Proposition 7 Suppose that the individual utility functions are identical and
state-independent. Consider a state s ∈ S around which there is increasing
disagreement. The following two conditions are equivalent:
1 . T h ec o ll e c t i v ed e g r e eo fp e s s i m i s msδ
v(z,s) is smaller than the probability-
weighted mean of individual degrees of pessimism s− →
δ p(s)=Eq(s,e θ)sδ
p(s,e θ)/Eq(s,e θ)
for all distributions of e θ ;
2. The derivative of absolute risk tolerance with respect to consumption is
larger than unity: Tu
c (c) ≥ 1 for all c.
Proof: We use Lemma 1 with f1(θ)=q(s,θ),f 2(θ)=Tu(c(z,s,θ)) and
g(θ)= sδ
p(s,θ). Using the ￿rst-order condition associated to program (19),
we obtain that f1(θ)=ψ(z,s)/u0(c(z,s,θ)), where ψ(z,s) is the Lagrange
multiplier associated to the feasibility constraint. Lemma 1 requires that
f1(θ)/f2(θ)=ψ(z,s)/[u0(c(z,s,θ))Tu(c(z,s,θ))] and sδ
p(s,θ) be comonotone
in θ. Because we consider the case of increasing disagreement, we can as-
sume without loss of generality that q is decreasing in θ and that sδ
p(s,θ) is
increasing in θ. By property (36), the ￿rst assumption implies that c(z,s,θ)
is decreasing in θ.I ti m p l i e st h a tf1/f2 and g are comonotone if and only if










c (c)] ≥ 0
for all c.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt or e q u i r et h a tTu
c (c) ≥ 1.¥
We can estimate the deviation of sδ
v(z,s) with respect to s− →
δ p(s) if we
a s s u m et h a tt h ed i v e r g e n c eo fo p i n i o n si ss m a l l .O b s e r v et h a tt h ed i ﬀerence
















If e θ has a support in a small neighborhood of θ0, using Taylor expansions
yields the following approximation:
s− →
δ p(s) − sδ
v(z,s) ’ (Tu





=( 1 − Tu
c (c))cov(lnq(s,e θ),s δ
p(s,e θ)),
(43)
29with c = c(z,s,θ0). In the region of increasing disagreement, the sign of the
right-hand side of this approximation is positive if and only if Tu
c (c) is larger
than unity, as stated by Proposition 7. Observe that the deviation of sδ
v(z,s)
with respect to s− →
δ p(s) does not depend upon the degree of disagreement. It
is approximately proportional to the rate of increase of disagreement which
is measured by −cov(lnq(s,e θ),s δ
p(s,e θ)).
Considering the particular case in which Eλ(e θ)ps(s,e θ)=0 , or equiva-
lently s− →
δ p(s)=0 , we obtain the following Corollary which is due to Varian
(1985) and Ingersoll (1987).
Corollary 2 Suppose that the individual utility functions are identical and
state-independent. Consider an interval in S in which increasing s increases
disagreement but preserves the Pareto-weighted mean subjective probability
Eλ(e θ)p(s,e θ). If Tu
c (c) ≥ 1 for all c, then the collective subjective probability
















Au and Pu are respectively the degree of absolute risk aversion and absolute
prudence. Kimball (1990) shows that absolute prudence is useful to measure
the impact of risk on the marginal value of wealth. Namely, he shows that the
eﬀect of risk on the marginal value of wealth is equivalent to a sure reduction
of wealth that is approximately proportional to the product of the variance of
the risk by Pu. Using equation (44), the derivative of absolute risk tolerance




c (c) ≥ 1 ⇔ P
u(c) ≥ 2A
u(c). (45)
There is a simple intuition to Corollary 2. It states that, everything
else unchanged, the group should devote more eﬀort to ￿nance aggregate
consumption in states with more disagreement if Pu is larger than 2Au.
The paradigm of the veil of ignorance is useful for this intuition. Under
the veil of ignorance, more disagreement can be reinterpreted as more risk,
which has two con￿icting eﬀects on the marginal value of aggregate wealth
vz.T h e ￿rst eﬀect is a precautionary eﬀect. The increase in risk has an
30eﬀect on vz that is equivalent to a sure reduction of aggregate wealth that is
approximately proportional to absolute prudence. But this does not take into
account of the fact that the group does rebalance consumption towards the
more optimistic agents. This endogenous negative correlation between the
weighted probability λ(θ)p(s,θ) and individual consumption is favorable to
the expected consumption Eλ(e θ)p(s,e θ)c(z,s,e θ). Under the veil of ignorance,
this makes the representative agent implicitly wealthier, thereby reducing the
marginal value of wealth. This wealth eﬀect is proportional to the rate at
which marginal utility decreases with consumption. It is thus proportional to
Au. Globally, more disagreement raises the marginal value of wealth if the
precautionary eﬀect dominates the wealth eﬀect, or if absolute prudence is
suﬃciently larger than absolute risk aversion. This provides an intuition to
condition Pu ≥ 2Au, or Tu
c ≥ 1.9
The reader can easily obtain the following results by symmetry with what
we obtained in the previous subsection.
Proposition 8 Suppose that all agents have the same state-independent util-
ity function that exhibits the property that Tu
c ≥ 1. Suppose also that the MLR
condition ∂sδ
q/∂θ ≥ 0 holds for all s ∈ S, and that there exists a state t ∈ S
such that q(t,θ)=q for all θ ∈ Θ. It implies that, for all z,t h ec o l l e c t i v e
degree of pessimism sδ
v(z,s) crosses the mean degree of pessimism s− →
δ p(s)
only at t, from above.
Corollary 3 Suppose that all agents have the same state-independent utility
function that exhibits the property that Tu
c ≥ 1. Suppose also that the MLR
condition ∂sδ
q/∂θ ≥ 0 holds for all s ∈ S, and that there exists a state t ∈ S
such that q(t,θ)=q for all θ ∈ Θ. It implies that, for all z, there exists an




≤ − → p (s) if s ∈ Iz
≥ − → p (s) if s / ∈ Iz, (46)
where the probability densities pv and − → p are characterized respectively by
−pv
s(z,s)/pv(z,s)= sδ
v(z,s) and − → p (s)=Eλ(e θ)p(s,e θ). These inequalities
are reversed under increasing absolute risk aversion.
9In the Arrow-Debreu portfolio context, Gollier (2002) shows that condition Pu ≥ 2Au
is necessary and suﬃcient for a mean-preseving spread in the distribution of state price
per unit of probability to raise the marginal value of wealth.
31These results are reversed if Tu
c is less than unity.
The assumption that agents have decreasing absolute risk aversion is a
widely accepted hypothesis in our profession. The plausibility of condition
Tu
c ≥ 1 is much more questionable. In fact, most specialists in the ￿eld
believe that Tu
c is smaller than unity. The argument goes as follows. In the
absence of any direct estimate of the sensitivity of absolute risk tolerance to
changes in wealth, we consider the CRRA speci￿cation u(c)=c1−γ/(1 − γ)
for which Tu(c)=c/γ. It implies that Tu
c ≥ 1 if and only if γ is smaller than
unity. Relying on asset pricing data and the equity premium puzzle, one
must conclude that relative risk aversion must be much larger than unity.
Therefore, all results in this subsection should be interpreted by considering
their contraposition with Tu
c (c) ≤ 1! Notice that the limit case is the logarith-
mic utility function for which Tu
c (c) ≡ 1. T h i si st h eo n l yc a s ei nw h i c hu s i n g
the alternative aggregation rule based on − → p (s)=Eλ(e θ)p(s,e θ) is socially
eﬃcient. When Tu
c (c) ≤ 1, using this rule will induce the planner to demand
too many Arrow-Debreu securities in states with a low level of disagreement,
and not enough in states with a high level of disagreement. This conclusion
is exactly opposite to the one presented in the previous subsection when the
planner use the aggregation rule based on sδ
p
.
One of the consequences of this result is that pv(z,s) needs not be in the
interval bounded by minθ∈Θ p(s,θ) and maxθ∈Θ p(s,θ). Consider the special
case of equal Pareto weights λ(θ)=1for all θ. Suppose that there is a
state t for which there is no divergence of opinion about the probability
p(t,θ)=− → p of occurrence. Using Corollary 3 with the plausible Tu
c ≤ 1,
it implies that the collective probability pv(e z,t) of state t is larger than the
unanimously agreed individual probability of that state! More generally, the
state probability of the representative agent may not be within the range of
the probabilities associated to that state by the diﬀerent agents of the group.
This is in sharp contrast with the collective degree of pessimism, which we
know is a weighted average of individual degrees of pessimism.
We illustrate these results by the following example. There is a continuum
of states represented by S =[ 0 ,1]. There are two agents in the group. The
beliefs of agent θp are represented by the density function p(s,θp)=2− 2s,
which implies that sδ
p(s,θp)=( 1− s)−1.A g e n tθo has a density function
p(s,θo)=2 s, which implies that sδ
p(s,θo)=−s−1. Observe that the
MLR condition is satis￿ed for this pair of beliefs. They are represented
by the dashed lines in Figure 5. We assume that agents have the same state-

















Figure 4: The collective degree of pessimism for u(c,θ)=c1−γ/(1 − γ),
λ(θp)=λ(θo),p (s,θp)=2− 2s,a n dp(s,θo)=2 s.
independent utility function u(c)=c1−γ/(1 − γ), where γ is constant rela-
tive risk aversion. We consider the Pareto eﬃcient allocation associated to
λ(θp)=λ(θo).I n c r e a s i n gs from 0 ￿rst tends to reduce disagreement. The
index of disagreement goes to zero for state t =0 .5.A b o v et, increasing s in-
creases disagreement. Because Eλ(e θ)p(s,e θ)=1for all s ∈ S, we immediately
obtain that s− →
δ p(s) ≡ 0. We draw Figure 4 where the two plain curves are
for the eﬃcient collective degrees of pessimism sδ
v, respectively for γ =1 0
and γ =0 .1. We see that sδ
v and s− →
δ p ≡ 0 cross only once respectively from
below and from above, as stated in Proposition 8. We also observe that the
curve representing the eﬃcient collective degree of pessimism always cross
sδ
p
(dashed curve) from above, because u exhibits DARA. This is another
illustration of Proposition 6.
Observe that because the mean state density is uniformly equal to unity,
we can apply Corollary 2. In particular, the eﬃcient collective density func-
tion is uniform when agents are logarithmic (γ =1 ) . We represented in Fig-
ure 5 the eﬃcient collective beliefs either when γ =1 0 ,a n dw h e nγ =0 .1.
When γ =1 0 , the eﬃcient density function is hump-shaped, whereas it is













Figure 5: The collective density function for u(c,θ)=c1−γ/(1−γ),p (s,θp)=
2 − 2s,a n dp(s,θo)=2 s.
U-shaped in the case of γ =0 .1. This is a direct consequence of Corollary 2,
since any move from s =0 .5 towards the bounds of interval [0,1] yields more
disagreement.
8 The equity premium and doubts on the oc-
currence of a boom
What are the implications of these results on the equity premium? The
equity premium is the expected excess return that is obtained at equilibrium
when accepting to bear the collective risk rather than investing in a risk
free bond. There is a speci￿cd i ﬃculty to use this concept when there is no
agreed-upon probability distribution for the excess return. We consider the
position of the econometrician who can use a long time series of observations.
The sample average state probability − → p (s) equals the objective probability of
state s. For some reasons, investors disagree on these state probabilities, but
we assume that their expectations are unbiased on average: Ep(s,e θ)=− → p (s)
34for all s ∈ S.10
The group is reinterpreted as an exchange economy ￿ la Lucas (1978),
which implies that the equilibrium condition is ω(s)=z(s) for all s,w h e r e
ω(s) and z(s) are respectively the mean endowment and the mean consump-
tion in state s.T h e￿rst-order condition of program (20) can be rewritten as
an equilibrium condition as follows:
vz(ω(s),s)=π(s),
where π(s) is the price of the Arrow-Debreu security associated to state s.
Suppose that investors have state-independent ISHARA utility functions.
We know from Proposition 3 that vz is multiplicatively separable in that

























The objective expected payoﬀ of equity is equal to − → ￿ =
R
S
− → p (s)ω(s)ds. As













When beliefs are homogeneous, pv(.) and − → p (.) coincide, and the calibration
of the parameters in equation (47) using historical data yields an equity
premium that is much smaller than the average equity premium observed
on ￿nancial markets during the last century. In this section, we examine
whether the heterogeneity of beliefs could explain this puzzle.
It is intuitive that the equity premium would be increased if the represen-
tative agent would perceive equity as riskier than what is suggested by the
econometrician. A larger equity premium would then be necessary to com-
pensate for the larger subjective risk. Observe that the example summarized
10This is in sharp contrast with Abel (2002) who assumes alternatively that investors
share their beliefs p(s,θ)=p(s) ∀θ, which are systematically biased with respect to the
objective probability distribution p∗.
35in Figure 5. Suppose that aggregate wealth is equal to s so that the horizon-
tal axis in this ￿gure measures wealth. The objective distribution of wealth
is therefore uniform on [0,1] in this example. When relative risk aversion
is larger than unity, the divergence of opinions tends to reduce the proba-
bility of the extreme states, and to raise the probability of medium-wealth
states. This means that the representative agent perceives the collective risk
as smaller than what is given by the objective distribution. Following Propo-
sition 7, this is due to the fact that the divergence of opinions is strongest for
the probability of the extreme events. Under the assumption that the deriva-
tive of absolute risk aversion is less than unity, this reduces the probability of
these events, thereby reducing the risk perceived by the representative agent.
Solving the equity premium puzzle would rather require concentrating the
divergence of opinions to the medium-wealth states. This is not the most
plausible assumption that one can do about the distribution of beliefs on
￿nancial markets. We will therefore not pursue this line of research.11
Let us alternatively assume that most of the divergence of opinions is
concentrated on the probability of occurrence of a boom. The structure of
individual beliefs are similar to those described in Figure 6. Suppose that
ω(s)=s, and assume that S =]a,b].T h e r e i s a b o o m i f s ∈ [b − ∆,b].
Individual θ believes that the probability of a boom state s is (1 − θ)− → p (s).
For all s<b−∆−ε, the subjective probability of state s for agent θ equals
(1−(1−θ)k)− → p (s)/(1−k),w h e r ek =
R b
b−∆
− → p (s)ds is the objective probability
of a boom. In the small interval I =[ b−∆−ε,b−∆[, the individual beliefs
are selected in order to guarantee that p(s,θ) be diﬀerentiable with respect






for all s except in interval I.We assume that k and ∆ are small, so that most
of the disagreement is concentrated in the boom probability. It implies that
the degree of disagreement is decreasing in interval I. Under the assumption
that Tu
c ≤ 1, Proposition 7 implies that sδ
v(s) must be smaller than s− →
δ p(s).
It implies that the representative agent has beliefs that are ￿rst-order stochas-
tically dominated by the objective probability distribution. More speci￿cally,
11An additional reason for this is that it is in general not true that an increase in the
equity risk reduces the demand for equity by all risk-averse investors, thereby reducing the
equilibrium price of equity. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), Gollier (1995) and Abel
(2002).














Figure 6: Most of the divergence of opinions is concentrated on the proba-
bility of occurence of a boom. Relative risk aversion γ equals 10. The beliefs
pv of the representative agent is ￿rst-order stochastically dominated by the
mean beliefs − → p .




k1− → p (s) ≥ − → p (s) if s ≤ b − ∆ − ε
k2− → p (s) ≤ − → p (s) if s ≥ b − ∆. (48)
with k1 =( 1− k2k)/(1 − k) ≥ 1. Perceiving equity returns as less favor-
able, the representative agent would reduce his demand for equity, thereby
increasing the equilibrium equity premium.
Proposition 9 Suppose that most of the divergence in opinions is concen-
trated in the probability of occurrence of a boom. Suppose that agents have
CRRA preferences u(c)=c1−γ/(1 − γ) with γ > 1. It implies that the het-
erogeneity of beliefs raises the equity premium.
Proof: It remains to prove that a transfer of probability mass from the
wealthiest state to the other states raises the equity premium φ. In Appendix
37B, we prove that PeRf is reduced by a change in the probability density
pv that transfers probability mass from any state with wealth per capita
ω ≥ ω uniformly the other states, as in (48). This critical wealth level
ω is strictly smaller than the upper bound of the support of the wealth
distribution. It implies that the equity premium φ = ￿/P eRf is increased by
the heterogeneity of beliefs when the divergence of opinions is concentrated
in the probability of occurrence of the wealthiest state.¥
In the rest of this section, we consider a credible calibration exercise whose
o b j e c t i v ei st os h o wt h a tt h ee ﬀect of divergent opinions may have a strong
impact on the equity premium. We assume that all agents have the same
utility function with a constant relative risk aversion γ equaling 4. Suppose
that agents form expectations for the future growth rate of the economy from
observing the realized growth rates of real GDP per capita in the U.S.A.
over the 70￿s and 80￿s (source Penn-World data). The mean growth rate
h a sb e e n1 . 7 2 %p e ry e a r ,a n dt h es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o ne q u a l l e d2 . 4 8 % . This
is not far from the historical mean (1.8%) and standard deviation (3.56%)
that have been reported by Kocherlakota (1996) for the period 1889-1978.
In a situation where agents agree on the probability distribution that would
attach a probability 1/20 to each of the 20 observations, the equilibrium
equity premium would equal 0.25% per year, far below the average equity
premium of 6% observed during the last century.
Suppose alternatively that agents disagree on the probability distribution
of the growth rate of the economy. We gathered the ￿ve best years of these
two decades, for which the growth rate exceeded 3.7%. These states are re-
ferred to as boom states, whereas the other states are referred to as ￿normal￿
states . From our data, the objective probability of a boom equals 1/4. The
objective probability of the occurrence of a normal state is 3/4. But, for
some reason, agent of type θ attaches a probability θ not necessarily equal to
3/4 to the occurrence of a normal state. The probability of occurrence of a
boom is the only source of divergence of opinions. This means in particular
that all agents agree on the probability of 1/5 (1/15) of each of the observed
growth rates conditional to a (no-)boom. We stress the fact that our simula-
tions preserve the mean expectations which are equal to the objective ones.
More precisely, we assume that the mean e θ is 3/4. There are two groups of
e q u a ls i z ea n dw i t ht h es a m eP a r e t o - w e i g h t s .T h em e m b e r so ft h eo p t i m i s t i c
group believe that the probability of occurrence of a normal state is θm that
is smaller than 3/4 , whereas the members of the pessimistic group believes
that the probability of occurrence of a normal state is 1.5− θm > 3/4.C o n -









Figure 7: The equity premium in percent per year as a function of the degree
of heterogeneity. The degree of heterogeneity is unity when e θ is distributed
as (0.5,1/2;1,1/2). It is zero for e θ ∼ (0,75,1/2;0.75,1/2). More generally,
the degree of heterogeneity is measured by 3 − 4θm.
sider in particular case θm =1 /2, in which case the optimistic group believes
that a boom will occur with certainty, whereas the pessimistic group believes
that this event will occur only with probability 1/2. With such a strong
divergence of opinions on the occurrence of a boom, the equilibrium equity
premium goes up to 0.96%. It is far to explain the equity premium puzzle,
but it multiplies almost by a factor 4 the equity premium that would have
been observed without heterogeneous beliefs. In Figure 7, we describe the
equity premium as a function of the degree of divergence of opinions. We
see that the equity premium increases with the degree of heterogeneity at an
increasing rate. The details of our computations are presented at the end of
Appendix C.
W ec o u l dh a v ea l t e r n a t i v e l ya s s u m e dt h a tm o s to ft h ed i v e r g e n c eo fo p i n -
39ions is concentrated on the probability of occurrence of a krach. Under the
assumption that the derivative of absolute tolerance is less than unity, this
would tend to reduce the equity premium. Why shouldn￿t we take into ac-
count of the extremely pessimistic agents who believe that the likelihood of
a krach is high? Just because these agents will purchase insurance against
the occurrence of the krach state. At the limit, they will stay out of the
equity market. Only the optimistic agents will participate. That will have a
negative impact on the equity premium.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Our aim in this paper was to characterize the probability distribution that
should be used for collective decision making when individuals diﬀer about
their expectations. To examine this question, we assumed that agents can
share risk eﬃciently, thereby relying on techniques borrowed from the theory
of ￿nance. The basic ingredient behind our results is that, in aggregating in-
dividual beliefs, one should favor the beliefs of agents that bear a larger share
of the risk. However, the allocation of risk in the economy is endogenous and
it depends upon the individual beliefs. Therefore, eﬃcient risk allocations are
more diﬃcult to characterize under expectations disagreement. For example,
it is not necessarily eﬃcient to wash out diversi￿able risks in that case. It
may be eﬃcient for agents to gamble against each others in spite of their risk
aversion. Horsetrack betting is Pareto-improving when agents have diﬀerent
beliefs about the chances of the competing horses.
In an Arrow-Debreu framework, the risk exposure of an individual is a
local concept that is measured by local diﬀerences in state consumption lev-
els across states. As is well-known, the socially eﬃcient local risk exposure
for an agent is proportional to his local degree of absolute risk tolerance
which measures the rate at which marginal utility decreases with consump-
tion. We showed that this result remains true with heterogeneous beliefs.
Associated to this concept of local risk tolerance, we developed a concept
of local pessimism, which is measured by the rate at which the subjective
state probability decreases across states. We showed that, locally, the degree
of pessimism of the representative agent is the mean of individual degrees
of pessimism weighted by the individual degrees of absolute risk tolerances.
This result gives some ￿esh to the intuition that the collective beliefs should
be biased in favor of the beliefs of the risk-takers. This result has several
40important consequences.
First, it implies that the socially eﬃcient collective probability distribu-
tion depends upon the aggregate wealth level of the group. This is because
the aggregate wealth level aﬀects the way risks should be allocated in the
group. However, when agents have the same HARA utility function, changes
in aggregate wealth has no eﬀect on the allocation of risks. This implies that
the collective probability distribution is independent of wealth in that case.
We showed that the identically-sloped HARA case is the only case in which
such separability property between beliefs and utility holds. In all other
cases, it is not possible to separate the contribution function v(z,s) into the
product of a state probability and a utility function, the ￿rst being inde-
pendent of the consumption level and the second being independent of the
state. In short, it implies that the representative agent has a state-dependent
utility function.
Second, we derived various results that are useful to understand the ef-
fect of the divergence of opinions on the shape of the collective probability
distribution. To do this, we de￿ned the concept of increasing disagreement,
and we assumed that agents have the same state-independent utility func-
tion. . In short, there is more disagreement about the probability of state s0
than about the probability of state s if the individual subjective probabili-
ties are more dispersed in state s0 than in state s. If the average degree of
pessimism is the same in the two states, we showed that the collective degree
of pessimism should be smaller in state s0 with higher disagreement if and
only if absolute risk aversion is decreasing. If we alternatively assume that
the (Pareto-weighted) average subjective probability is the same in the two
states, the collective degree of pessimism is positive if and only if the deriva-
tive of absolute risk tolerance is smaller than unity, a plausible hypothesis on
preferences. It must be stressed that these results are purely local. They do
not provide a global view about how the beliefs of the representative agent
are aﬀected by the heterogeneity of beliefs.
T h el a s ts t e pi st ol i n kt h es t r u c t u r eo fd i s a g r e e m e n ta tt h eg l o b a ll e v e lt o
the global properties of the collective probability distribution. When most
disagreements are concentrated in the wealthier states, the collective distribu-
tion function is dominated by the average individual probability distribution
in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. This tends to raise the equity
premium. We showed in a simple numerical example that the heterogeneity
of individual beliefs may have a sizeable eﬀect on the equity premium.
The critical assumption of this model is that the group can allocate risk
41eﬃciently. This assumption is diﬃcult to test. For example, the eﬃcient
coverage of earthquake coverage in various regions can be interpreted in two
ways. The optimistic view is that homeowners are less pessimistic than insur-
ers about the risk, which implies that the low insurance coverage is socially
eﬃcient. But alternatively, it could be interpreted as a proof that markets
are incomplete. A similar problem arises to explain the insurance crisis after
9/11/01, or about the diﬃculty to share the risk related to global warming
on an international basis. A possible extension of this work would be to
consider an economy with incomplete markets.
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44Appendix A: The case of ISHARA preferences
We have shown in section 2 that the concept of pessimism is more use-
ful than probabilities themselves to examine the optimal risk exposure when
markets are complete. The individual degree of pessimism is an index mea-
suring probability diﬀerences across states. However, it may be useful to
examine the direct eﬀect of divergent beliefs on the eﬃcient probability distri-
bution. This can be done by ￿rst deriving the collective degree of pessimism
δ







Finally, the normalizing constant of this PDE must be selected in order to
guarantee that
R
S pv(z(s),s)ds =1 .
In this appendix, we examine the special case of ISHARA preferences
(32) for which we know from proposition 3 that the diﬀerential equation
is simpli￿e db yt h ef a c tt h a tsδ
v is independent of z. I ti m p l i e st h a tt h e
collective probability distribution pv is also wealth independent. Moreover,
ISHARA preferences (32) yield an analytical solution for the aggregation
problem. Indeed, in this particular case, the ￿rst-order condition to state-
dependent the Pareto program (19) implies that
c(z,s,θ) − a(θ)=k(s)[λ(θ)p(s,θ)]
1/γ .






































45where C is a constant. In order for pv be a probability density, we need to

















Calvet, Grandmont and Lemaire (2001) obtained the same solution. Thus, in
the ISHARA case, we can directly compute the socially eﬃcient probability
distribution of risk as a function of individual beliefs p, the Pareto weights
λ, and the concavity coeﬃcient γ. Two special cases are worthy to examine.
Consider ￿rst the case with γ tending to zero. This corresponds to risk-neutral
preferences above a minimum level of subsistence. Under this speci￿cation,






for all s. (risk-neutral case)
With risk-neutral preferences, the eﬃcient allocation produces a ￿ip-￿op
strategy where the cake in state s is entirely consumed by the agent with
the largest Pareto-weighted probability associated to that state. It implies
that the group will use a state probability p0 proportional to it to determine
its attitude toward risk ex ante.
In the case of logarithmic preferences (γ =1 ) , the denominator in (51)
equals Eλ(e θ) since
Z
S











1(s)= def Eλ(e θ)p(s,e θ) for all s.( l o g a r i t h m i cc a s e )
With these Bernoullian preferences, the eﬃcient probability that should be
associated to any state s is just the weighted mean p1(s) of the individual
subjective probabilities of that state s. This is the limit case Tu
c ≡ 1 of the
result presented in Proposition 7.
46Appendix B: Change in beliefs and the equity premium
In this Appendix, we show that a uniform transfer of probability mass
from a high wealth state reduces the future price of equity PeRf.I ti m p l i e s
that the equity premium φ = ￿/P eRf is reduced.
Proposition 10 Consider a random variable e y(p) which is distributed as
(e x,p;x0,1 − p), with x0 ∈ R and p ∈ [0,1]. Suppose that the real-valued





is decreasing in p if and only if x0 is larger than x = Ee xv0(e x)/Ev0(e x), which
is the risk-neutral mean of e x.
Proof: FPe(p) is decreasing in p if and only if
[Ee xv
0(e x) − x0v
0(x0)]Ev
0(e y) − [Ev
0(e x) − v
0(x0)]Ee yv
0(e y) ≤ 0,
where e y is distributed as (e x,p;x0,1−p). This condition can be rewritten as
p[v
0(x0)Ee xv




0(e x) − x0v
0(x0)Ev




0(e x) − x0Ev
0(e x)] ≤ 0.
This is true if and only if x0 is larger than x = Ee xv0(e x)/Ev0(e x). ¥
Appendix C: Numerical illustration
In this appendix, we provide the details of the numerical illustration pre-
sented at the end of section 8. We assume that all agents have the same
state-independent utility function u(c)=−c−3/3, which yields a constant
relative risk aversion equaling γ =4 .W ec o n s i d e rt h eP a r e t o - e ﬃcient solu-
tion with equal weights. The percentage yearly growth rate of real GDP per
capita for period 1970-1990 in the United States is
DlogGDP =( 2 .04,3.74,4.4,−2.14,−2.89,4.13,3.78,3.94,1.26,−0.02,
1.34,−4.06,2.57,5.94,1.90,1.65,1.96,2.96,2.13,−0.23)
47(source Penn-World data). Let e ω1 be the uniformly distributed and dis-
c r e t er a n d o mv a r i a b l ew h o s es u p p o r ti sg i v e nb yt h e1 5s m a l l e s te l e m e n t so f
DlogGDP . Similarly, let e ω2 be the uniformly distributed and discrete ran-
d o mv a r i a b l ew h o s es u p p o r ti sg i v e nb yt h e5l a r g e s te l e m e n t so fDlogGDP
. The ￿objective￿ risk on the growth rate is the random variable e ω which is
distributed as (e ω1,3/4; e ω2,1/4).I t sm e a ne q u a l sEe ω = − → ￿ =1 .0172,w h i c h
implies a mean growth rate of real GDP per capita of 1.72% p e ry e a rd u r -
ing the period. When all agents have the same beliefs that is represented






or 0.25% per year.
We now consider an economy with heterogenous beliefs. Agent θ has be-
liefs on the growth rate per capita that are distributed as e y(θ) ∼ (e y1,θ;e y2,1−
θ). Let types be distributed as e θ ∼ (θm,1/2;1.5−θm,1/2),s ot h a tt h em e a n
type is Ee θ =3 /4. It means that individual expectations are equal to e y on
average. It implies that p(ω,θ)=θ/15 if ω is in the support of e ω1,a n d
p(ω,θ)=( 1− θ)/5 if ω is in the support of e ω2. From Appendix B, we know




(θm/15)1/γ + ((1.5 − θm)/15)1/γ¤γ
15[(θm/15)1/γ +( ( 1 .5 − θm)/15)1/γ]
γ + 5[((1 − θm)/5)1/γ +( ( θm − 0.5)/5)1/γ]
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((1 − θm)/5)1/γ +( ( θm − 0.5)/5)1/γ¤γ
15[(θm/15)1/γ +( ( 1 .5 − θm)/15)1/γ]
γ + 5[((1 − θm)/5)1/γ +( ( θm − 0.5)/5)1/γ]
γ




k1/15 if ω is in the support of e ω1;
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1/γ +( 1 .5 − θm)1/γ]
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For example, when e θ is distributed as (0.5,1/2;1,1/2), i.e., when θm =0 .5, we
obtain that k1 ’ 0.96. This is to be compared to k1 =0 .75 in the homogenous
case with θm =0 .75. This represents a massive transfer of probability mass
to the lower wealth states compared to the objective distribution. Because
Ee ω
−γ
1 =0 .973,E e ω
−γ
2 =0 .894,E e ω
1−γ
1 =0 .978,E e ω
1−γ
2 =0 .878,
we conclude that φ =1 .0096, yielding an equity premium equaling 0.96%.
In Figure 7, we evaluate the equity premium for other values of θm.
;
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